Hemispheric Reconfiguration in a Transitional Global Order
The international system is undergoing a structural transition marked by great-power competition, institutional fragmentation, and the weakening of multilateral regimes. Strategic rivalry between the United States and China, ongoing conflict in Eastern Europe, and the proliferation of hybrid threats have consolidated a competitive multipolar environment.
In this context, the Western Hemisphere is regaining central importance in U.S. strategic planning — not as a political periphery, but as a critical security space.
From the “Pivot to Asia” to Hemispheric Recalibration
For over a decade, U.S. foreign policy prioritized the Indo-Pacific under the “pivot to Asia” paradigm. Latin America was largely confined to sectoral agendas — migration, trade, or counter-narcotics cooperation — without a comprehensive strategic vision.
That equation has changed.
China’s economic and technological expansion in the region — from port infrastructure to telecommunications and energy financing — combined with Russian diplomatic and security engagement, has altered the hemispheric balance. In parallel, criminal and logistical networks linked to extra-regional actors have deepened their footprint.
The hemisphere is no longer an uncontested sphere of influence. It is now a competitive strategic arena.
The emerging U.S. framework appears structured around four pillars:
Containment of extra-hemispheric actors in critical sectors Supply chain security and industrial nearshoring Irregular migration management Reinforced security and defense cooperation
This approach reflects an expanded national security doctrine in which economics, technology, and organized crime converge.
Transnational Organized Crime as a Strategic Variable
One of the most significant conceptual shifts is the growing recognition of transnational organized crime as a geopolitical factor.
Criminal organizations with territorial control, institutional penetration, and cross-border projection undermine sovereignty, erode governance, and create exploitable power vacuums. They are not merely law-enforcement challenges — they are systemic destabilizers.
Latin America is experiencing an advanced phase of transnational organized crime: diversified illicit economies, financial sophistication, territorial capture, and regional operational reach.
Strategic intelligence cooperation, financial disruption mechanisms, and institutional strengthening are becoming central components of hemispheric stability.
Energy, Critical Minerals, and Strategic Resilience
Latin America holds key assets for the global energy transition: lithium in the Southern Cone, copper in Chile and Peru, unconventional hydrocarbons in Argentina, and critical maritime corridors.
For the United States, securing reliable access to these resources is no longer simply an economic issue — it is a matter of national resilience. Reducing dependency on Asian supply chains in critical minerals and sensitive technologies has become a strategic priority.
Nearshoring is therefore not merely production relocation; it is geopolitical recalibration.
Yet the region is heterogeneous. Consolidated democracies coexist with hybrid regimes and structurally fragile states. This asymmetry will shape the depth and durability of future alignments.
Internal Security, Armed Forces, and Governance Challenges
The deterioration of public security across several countries has led to an expanded role for armed forces in supporting internal stability operations.
While U.S. defense cooperation may intensify — through training, interoperability, and intelligence sharing — long-term sustainability depends on institutional reform. Tactical militarization without judicial strengthening, financial intelligence modernization, and governance reconstruction risks producing short-term containment rather than structural stabilization.
Hemispheric security ultimately rests on legitimacy as much as operational capacity.
Chile and the Southern Cone: Stability Nodes in a Volatile Region
In a region marked by fragmentation and criminal violence, countries with institutional solidity may become strategic anchors.
Chile’s macroeconomic stability, global integration, and professionalized security institutions position it as a potential reliable partner within the emerging hemispheric architecture — provided long-term strategic vision prevails.
Alignment should not be automatic; it must be calculated and interest-based.
Conclusion: Subject or Object of Strategic Competition
Latin America stands at a crossroads.
The new U.S. strategic framework does not represent a return to traditional hemispheric hegemony. It reflects pragmatic adaptation to a competitive multipolar order.
Security, energy, migration, and organized crime are no longer separate policy domains. They form a single strategic ecosystem.
The decisive question is whether Latin America will act as a strategic subject — shaping its own trajectory — or remain an object within broader great-power competition.
Neutrality is shrinking. Strategic clarity is becoming indispensable.
Fernando Vaccotti 